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Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
the economic aspects of the process of reconstruction in the Balkans. It is this policy
paper that became the very first Working Paper of the wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
observatory.net, the internet portal of the wiiw Balkan Observatory. It is a portal for
research and communication in relation to economic developments in Southeast Europe
maintained by the wiiw since 1999. Since 2000 it also serves as a forum for the Global
Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
The wiiw Balkan Observatory Global Development Network 
Southeast Europe 
This study has been developed in the framework of research networks initiated and monitored by wiiw
under the premises of the GDN–SEE partnership. 
 
 
The Global Development Network, initiated by The World Bank, is a global network of
research and policy institutes working together to address the problems of national and
regional development. It promotes the generation of local knowledge in developing and
transition countries and aims at building research capacities in the different regions.  
 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies is a GDN Partner Institute and
acts as a hub for Southeast Europe. The GDN–wiiw partnership aims to support the
enhancement of economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to promote
knowledge transfer to SEE, to facilitate networking among researchers within SEE and
to assist in securing knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. 
 
The GDN–SEE programme is financed by the Global Development Network, the
Austrian Ministry of Finance and the Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank.  
 
For additional information see www.balkan-observatory.net, www.wiiw.ac.at and
www.gdnet.org 






















This paper studies the public-private wage inequality in Romania. Although 
public sector employment is perceived as safer and offers more benefits, we find that in 
Romania it also offers higher wages, after controlling for experience, education, and 
gender. Decomposing the public-private wage premium into the effect of personal 
characteristics, coefficients, and residuals, we show that only about half of this premium 
can be attributed to personal characteristics. The premium is increasing across the wage 
distribution, leading to more inequality in the public sector.  We also find the effects of 
self-selection are negligible, the premium being still positive and significant after 
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I. Introduction and context 
    The global economic crisis sparked a worldwide debate over the need to 
restructure the public sector. Public wages are at the center of this debate, with issues 
ranging from a perceived inequality to efficiency. 
In any country the public sector is an important employer, hence its wage-setting 
policy has an impact on the entire economy, both at micro and macroeconomic level. 
Compared to the private sector, public sector jobs are perceived to be safer and the pay 
more equitable, as the state often strives to be a ‘model’ employer and it is not subject to 
profit constraints. However, absent a unified public sector compensation framework and 
clear performance benchmarks, the wage-setting process can be uneven, politically-
driven and a source of inequality. 
Romania seems an iconic case study for the public sector pay debate. The public 
sector still employs about 30 percent of the workforce, and the wage bill is around 20 
percent of the current budget expenditures. These figures may seem reasonable compared 
to developed economies (for comparison, in the UK 50 percent of the government 
spending goes to wages, as the public sector employs a fifth of the total UK work force – 
see Chatterji et al., 2007), but it may still be unsustainable for an emerging economy.  
An unparalleled increase in the public sector wage bill, from 4.8 percent to 8.6 
percent of GDP, took place between 2004 and 2008. Moreover, the public sector wage 
bill increased to 9 percent of GDP in 2009 – a recession, but also an election year. 
Examples of unjustified pay differences within the public sector abound: assistant 
professors paid less than a city hall office assistant, junior surgeons paid less than 
cleaning workers.    3
To underscore the growing concern over public pay, one of the conditions of the 
IMF loan package granted to Romania in 2009 was the adoption of a unified public sector 
compensation framework. Later on, in mid-2010, all wages in the public administration 
were cut by a uniform 25 percent. The public sector was blamed for its lack of efficiency 
and lower productivity, although no measure of productivity in the public sector was ever 
presented, and the public employees were portrayed as the public enemies. The private 
sector, on the other hand, was seen as the idyllic employer, flexible and more efficient. 
This black and white picture made us raise some interesting research questions.  
Therefore, the purpose of our current research is to shed light on the determinants 
of the public-private wage differential and on the dynamics and decomposition of wage 
inequality between the private and public sector in 2004 and 2009. This research is the 
first of its kind for Romania, and provides a valuable input to the policy debate not only 
in Romania, but also in other economies where the public wage bill is now under 
scrutiny. 
The next section reviews the findings regarding the public-private wage inequality 
in transition and developing economies. It also summarizes the challenges arising in the 
empirical estimation of this premium, especially the self-selection issue. 
The third section presents the data and descriptive statistics for Romania. 
Descriptive statistics focus on the standard Mincerian model, where the wage depends on 
education, work experience, and gender.  
The fourth section presents estimates of the public-private wage premium from 
OLS regressions. On top of the standard determinants of wage mentioned above, we also 
include dummy variables for employees living in Bucharest and for occupational sector.   4
To account for the possibility of worker self-selection into the public or private sector, we 
use an instrumental variable approach. Although the instruments prove to be significant, 
there is little case for self-selection and the conclusion we reach using OLS regressions is 
still valid. 
The fifth section decomposes the wage premium into three factors: the impact of 
personal characteristics, coefficients, and residuals. This approach enables us to ascertain 
the existence of a ceiling or a floor in the public sector wages. The last section concludes. 
 
 
II. Literature review 
There is a large body of empirical literature on the pay differential between the 
public and private sector, starting with Smith (1976) and Gunderson (1979). The 
interested reader can consult Disney (2007) or Borjas (2002) for a more thorough review. 
Our literature review will focus on the most recent empirical methods and results, as well 
as the relevant literature regarding transition countries. 
The strand of the literature on public-private wage differential in transition 
countries is scant, most probably due to the limited availability of relevant panel or cross-
section data. Usually the public-private wage gap transition and developing countries is 
negative (higher wages in the private sector), as public sector pay is regulated and the 
wage bill is under intense scrutiny. A number of authors found this gap to be negative: 
Adamchick and Bedi (2000) for Poland, Leping (2005) for Estonia (the median wage 
differential was about 3 percent,), and Jovanovich and Lokshin (2004) for the Moscow 
region (a gap of 14.3 percent for men and 18.3 percent for women was uncovered). An   5
opposite conclusion was reached by Terrell (1993), who found that wages are higher in 
the public sector in Haiti. An interesting paper by Newell and Socha (2007) showed the 
wage distribution was more unequal in the Polish private sector compared to the public 
one. While in Poland it was the private sector wage growth that led to in increase in 
inequality between 1998 and 2002, in Romania it was the public sector that pushed up 
wages and inequality between 2004 and 2009.  
  A controversial issue when estimating public-private wage differences is self-
selection: the workers’ allocation between the two sectors may not be exogenous, and 
there may be unmodelled factors that affect both a worker’s sector selection and her 
wage. Some authors (Blackaby et al., 1999) argued that treating for endogeneity doesn’t 
bring any additional benefits, and doesn’t change the magnitude and significance of the 
premium, while others do not even take it into account (for example, Melly, 2005b).  
  One self-selection criterion is age: more experienced individuals tend to prefer 
public sector employment, as documented by Falaris (2003) for Bulgaria and Jovanovich 
and Lokshin (2004) for Moscow.  Two reasons were cited for this: more experienced 
people may prefer a safer employment, and the public sector offers more generous 
retirement benefits. Another criterion is education, more educated individuals preferring 
to work in the private sector, where their performance and skills are better rewarded 
(Adamchick and Bedi, 2000 document this for Poland). Women may also prefer to work 
in the public sector, as the hours are more flexible and there is virtually no overtime. Self-
selection can also stem from a vocation for a particular profession, like nurse or teacher, 
although there are private-sector jobs for these professions as well.  
  Different variables have been used in the literature to control for endogeneity in   6
the selection equation. Dustmann and van Soest (1998) used parental occupation 
(public/private) to instrument for a worker’s public private choice. Falaris (2003) used 
the amount of land received during Bulgaria’s property restitution programme as an 
instrument. For workers in the Moscow region, Jovanovich and Lokshin (2004) used the 
industry of employment pre-1992, the number of children, and marital status as 
instruments in the selection equation.  
  Because our dataset surveys entire families and not only individuals, we are in a 
position to see if there are any family members working in the public sector. To our 
knowledge, this is a novel way of instrumenting for the public-private sector choice. In 
addition to the existing studies, we can also account for the vocational source of self-
selection, as our dataset also registers the individual’s employment sector (agriculture, 
mining, education, and so on). 
  Another empirical strategy is decomposing the premium into differences in 
personal characteristics (covariates) and returns to these characteristics (coefficients) 
following the approach of Machado and Mata (2005). Our strategy follows Melly (2005a) 
where the premium is decomposed into three factors (changes in coefficients, covariates, 
and residuals) for every quantile of the wage distribution. This decomposition method 
allows us to investigate the existence of a floor and ceiling in public sector wages. The 
existence of a public sector ‘high floor and lower ceiling’ was highlighted, among others, 
by Melly (2005b), and is evident in the unconditional wage distribution in Fig. 1 – the 
right tail is longer and the left tail is thicker in the private sector.   
In transition economies the size of the informal sector also influences public 
sector choice and pay (Adamchik and Bedi, 2000; Reilly, Krstic and Litchfield, 2007)   7
and is a cause of the ‘high floor’ mentioned above. Public sector jobs are always in the 
formal sector, and when the informal sector is sizeable people may queue to get a job in 
the public sector. However, our survey data survey data includes a question on revenues 
from the informal sector, so our estimates will not suffer of this bias. 
 
III. Data Description 
We use the 2004-2009 waves of the Romanian Household Budget Survey (HBS), 
which samples about 3000 households per month. We only report here the data for the 
extremities of this relevant time interval (2004 - 2009), but we analyzed the data for each 
year in between. Trends are stable (the ends of the interval are not outliers in any respect) 
and the signs and significance of the regression variables do not change in the other 
years.  
Income from all sources and personal characteristics are registered in the survey.  
In 2004, 33,200 families and 70,773 adults were surveyed, while the 2009 wave 
comprises 31,600 families and 66,182 adults. Out of the total number of adults surveyed, 
about 50 percent are retired (46.4 percent in 2004 and 39.5 percent in 2009), so no 
employment data is registered. The remaining active population is divided into six 
employment categories: state, private, mixed, cooperative, public (national or local), and 
other. Because the aim of this paper is to uncover the public-private wage premium, we 
merge both state and public employment into one category (‘public’), as wages are paid 
from the consolidated public budget in both cases. Descriptive statistics for all variables 
used are shown in Appendix 1.
1 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise specified, all the statistics, figures and tables in this paper are authors’ calculations 
based on the Romanian Household Budget Survey.   8
The majority of the active labour force works in the private sector, as its share has 
increased between 2004 and 2009 from 77.3 percent to 83.4 percent of employees. This 
increase occurred mostly at the expense of those working in the public sector (state-
owned firms and public services), whose share declined from 20 percent to 15.5 percent. 
However, while the number of employees in stated-owned firms decreased as a result of 
privatization, the share of the public administration and services (national and local) 
increased by 44 percent (from 3.75 to 5.4 percent percent of the labour force between 
2004 and 2009); by comparison, real GDP only grew by an aggregated 29.5 percent 
during the same period.  
The average wage was higher in the public sector compared to the private one: the 
unconditional premium evaluated at the mean was 20.5 percent in 2009 and 22.4 percent 
in 2004. The same can be said about the unconditional premium evaluated at the median 
wage: 27.9 percent in 2009. The distribution of log of wages in the public and private 
sector (shown in Fig. 1) also supports this conclusion: compared to the public sector, a 
larger number of employees in the private sector are located in the left tail of the wage 
distribution, right above the minimum wage. One reason for this is the extent of the ‘grey 
economy’ in the private sector, where many employees are officially employed with the 
minimum wage, and receive the unreported difference in cash, in order to avoid the high 
labour taxes (particularly the social contribution tax). However, with the introduction of 
the flat tax in January 2005, there are less incentives to avoid a higher marginal tax rate 
(see Voinea and Mihaescu, 2009 for an analysis of the flat tax impact in Romania). At 
higher wage levels the wage density function in the public sector lies on top of the private 
one; for example, a fraction of 5.5 percent of the private sector employees earned in 2009   9
between 1600 and 1800 RON (EUR 380 to 425, at the average 2009 exchange rate), 
while the fraction of public sector employees in this bracket was almost double (10 
percent). 
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Of course there are different factors that influence wages, and a Mincerian human 
capital model is usually employed in the literature in order to compare them. Wages are 
thus assumed to depend on education, experience, and gender. We divide educational 
attainment into secondary (eight grades or less completed), high-school (high-school or 
less completed), and university (any degree higher than high-school completed).  
From Fig. 2 we see that the public sector employs significantly more university 
graduates compared to the private sector—about 40 percent compared to 20 percent of   10
the total employment. The share of university graduates also increased between 2004 and 
2009, for both sectors. This can be explained by the labour force becoming more 
educated, as employees with only a secondary school retire, and more and more of those 
coming on the labour market have a university degree. Sanfey and Krstic (2011), for 
example, found out that educational qualifications accounted for 45-50 percent of the 
explained level of inequality in Serbia. Another determinant of earning power is work 
experience. We compute work experience assuming education starts at seven years, and 
subtracting this and the number of years spent in school (eight for secondary school and 
fifteen for college) from the actual age. University or high-school full time students 
earning a wage are assumed to have one year of experience. This measure has its 
drawbacks, as it does not take into account on the job training, part-time studies 
completed after entering the labour force, or does not account for unemployment spells. 
However, no country-level survey provides such detailed information.  
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The public sector therefore employs more experienced workers (30+ years of 
experience), and less ‘inexperienced’ ones (less than 10 years of experience), as Fig. 3 
shows. One reason for this is the more generous pension system in the public sector, 
some employees (armed forces, ministry of interior employees and others) being part of a 
‘final salary’ pension scheme. Another reason is that a job in the public sector is 
perceived to be safer and less demanding. This probably leads to a self-selection process, 
where senior employees prefer a job in the public sector. Apart from that we notice an 
aging of the population, the median number of years of experience being 20 in 2004, and 
21 in 2009. There are two factors contributing to this: first, people working beyond their 
retirement age, and second, younger people migrating abroad. 
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The gender composition of the public sector labour force is balanced, while the 
private sector has more male employees. This fact, evident from Fig. 4, can also be due to 
a selection bias, women preferring a public sector job can be easier reconciled with 
family life, as working overtime is an exception in the public sector. Another hypothesis 
we consider is gender-based wage discrimination is less pronounced in the public sector. 
It is also evident from Fig. 4 that between 2004 and 2009 the share of women working in 
the private sector has decreased, which can be traced to the decreasing share of women in 
total employment (from 46.4 percent to 45.1 percent). 
 
IV. Estimating the public-private wage premium 
Our paper’s first contribution to the policy debate on public sector wages is 
establishing the existence and statistical significance of a wage premium over the private 
sector. The simplest way to test for the existence of a premium is to regress the log of   13
wage on education, experience, gender, employment contract type (as the survey doesn’t 
offer data on hours worked, this variable captures the lower earnings for those working 
part-time), and a dummy variable if the worker lives in Bucharest. The results are shown 
in Table 1 below (the ‘No Sector’ column). 
 
Table 1. OLS Regression, dependant variable: log of wage
2 
  2004   2009  
Independent Variable  No Sector  With Sector  No Sector  With Sector 
 is Public    0.106***   0.071***   0.098***   0.073*** 
Secondary Edu  -0.193***  -0.176***  -0.241***  -0.229*** 
Univ Edu  0.434***   0.436***   0.464***   0.456*** 
Work Exper <= 5y  -0.296***  -0.224***  -0.171***  -0.123*** 
Work Exper 5-10y  -0.183***  -0.147***  -0.09***  -0.063*** 
Work Exper 11-15y  -0.082***  -0.072***  -0.06***  -0.047*** 
Work Exper 16-20y  -0.065***  -0.062***  -0.029***  -0.025** 
Work Exper 26-30y  -0.011  -0.005   0.005   0.006 
Work Exper 31-35y  -0.04***  -0.025**  -0.002   0.005 
Work Exper > 35y  -0.066***  -0.047**  -0.037***  -0.028** 
Sex -0.197***  -0.163***  -0.215***  -0.187*** 
Term Contract  -0.217***  -0.201***  -0.249***  -0.244*** 
Bucharest   0.188***   0.19***   0.24***   0.237*** 
Agriculture N/A  -0.213***  N/A  -0.171*** 
Mining N/A    0.235***  N/A    0.231*** 
Manufacturing N/A  -0.086***  N/A  -0.074*** 
Utilities N/A    0.082***  N/A    0.065** 
Construction N/A  -0.112***  N/A  -0.014 
Retail N/A  -0.154***  N/A  -0.1*** 
Financial Services  N/A   0.178***  N/A   0.16*** 
Real Estate Intermediation  N/A  -0.062*  N/A  -0.084** 
Education N/A  -0.141***  N/A  -0.091*** 
Health and social assistance  N/A  -0.17***  N/A  -0.104*** 
Other social services  N/A  -0.192***  N/A  -0.103*** 
Housewives N/A  -0.238**  N/A  -0.053 
International Organisations  N/A  -0.075  N/A   0.292** 
Constant  6.053***   6.136***   6.813***   6.865*** 
No Obs  19 900  19 900  18 516  18 516 
Adj R-squared  0.4096  0.3291  0.3599  0.3982 
 
                                                 
2 *** means statistically significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent   14
The base case in our model is a male, full-time employee educated to secondary 
school level, at the peak of his earning power (between 25 and 30 years of work 
experience), and living outside Bucharest. The results of this Mincerian specification are 
in line with the theory, with wages increasing with education and experience, and being 
lower for women and part-time employees. The results show the existence of a positive 
wage premium for working in the public sector: given the same characteristics and skills, 
a public sector worker earned 10.6 percent more in 2004, and 9.8 percent in 2009. The 
other dummy variables have the expected sign: the wages were 19 percent higher in 
Bucharest in 2004 compared to the rest of the country, and this difference increased to 24 
percent in 2009.  
The third and fifth column of Table 1 (labeled ‘With Sector’) contrast the results 
in the second and fourth column discussed above with an OLS regression with 
occupational sector dummies. The base sector is transportation, chosen because is well 
represented in both public and private sectors (see Table 2 for a breakdown). After 
accounting for occupation, the wage premium is still strongly significant, albeit lower 
(about 7 percent compared 10 percent before). Compared to the transportation sector, the 
wages are distributed as expected: higher in the financial services, mining and utilities, 
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Table 2. Share of public sector employment for different occupations 
   Share of Public 
Sector Employment 
  
Occupational Sector  2004  2009 
Agriculture 32.4%  25.6% 
Mining 76.0%  56.4% 
Manufacturing 10.0%  4.3% 
Utilities 73.1%  45.3% 
Construction 11.4%  5.2% 
Retail 5.6%  2.4% 
Transportation, communications  43.0%  25.6% 
Financial Services  40.6%  22.7% 
Real Estate Intermediation  17.5%  11.1% 
Public Administration, Defense  91.5%  89.4% 
Education 95.8%  93.1% 
Health and social assistance  83.3%  75.8% 
Other social services  33.0%  25.7% 
 
 
However, this approach assumes that both sectors treat the Mincerian 
characteristics in the same way; for example the impact of having a university degree is 
constrained to be the same for both sectors. The results in Table 3 relax this assumption 
by adding an interaction term for each independent variable (the third and the fifth 
column). This variable therefore separates the impact of a characteristic into public and 
private sector. For example, if the interaction coefficient of the ‘Univ Edu’ (employees 
having a university degree and working in the public sector) is significant and positive, 
then we can conclude that the public sector rewards more a university-educated employee 
compared to the private sector. 
 
   16
Table 3. Regression with relaxed Mincerian assumptions; dependant variable: log of 
wage 
  2004   2009  




 is Public    0.207***     0.136***   
Secondary Edu  -0.137***  -0.132***  -0.195***  -0.164*** 
Univ Edu   0.46***  -0.055***   0.469***  -0.053*** 
Work Exper <= 5y  -0.168***  -0.217***  -0.108***  -0.098*** 
Work Exper 5-10y  -0.114***  -0.102***  -0.057***  -0.03  
Work Exper 11-15y  -0.057***  -0.047*  -0.059***   0.05* 
Work Exper 16-20y  -0.044***   -0.048**  -0.029**   0.016  
Work Exper 26-30y   0.009    -0.037   -0.001    0.031  
Work Exper 31-35y  -0.025    -0.008   -0.001   0.028  
Work Exper > 35y  -0.038*   -0.012   -0.035**   0.04  
Term Contract  -0.158***  -0.014   -0.218***  -0.084  
Sex  -0.182***  -0.043   -0.183***  -0.011  
Bucharest    0.213***  -0.067***   0.253***  -0.077*** 
Agriculture  -0.196***  -0.028   -0.169***  -0.002  
Mining   0.092*   0.158***   0.168***   0.085* 
Manufacturing -0.057***    -0.086***  -0.058***  -0.106*** 
Utilities   0.06*  -0.001   0.065**  -0.027  
Construction -0.078***  -0.172***  0.001  -0.126*** 
Retail  -0.137***  -0.013   -0.09***  -0.072  
Financial Services   0.287***  -0.303***   0.17***  -0.079  
Real Estate Intermediation  -0.042    -0.078   -0.089***   0.068  
Public Administration, Defense  -0.211***  0.193***  -0.126***   0.138*** 
Education  -0.106    -0.041   -0.088**  -0.017  
Health and social assistance  -0.104***   -0.092**  -0.057   -0.082* 
Other social services  -0.145***  -0.128***  -0.081***  -0.089** 
Constant   6.083***     6.848***   
No  Obs  19,900   18,516  
Adj  R-squared  0.3393    0.35199   
 
 
The public wage premium is still positive and significantly different from zero, 
but it decreased between 2004 and 2009 from 20.7 percent to 13.6 percent.  The public 
sector attaches a lower premium on university education, compared to the private sector. 
For example, if a university degree commanded a 46 percent premium over a high school 
degree in 2004, and a 47 percent premium in 2009, this premium was 5.5 percent and 5.3   17
percent lower, respectively, if you worked in the public sector. When it comes to 
experience, a pattern emerges for those less experienced (less than 5 years experience): 
they earn less in the public sector compared to their private counterparts. For example, in 
2004 an employee with less than 5 years experience earned about 22 percent less in the 
public sector compared to the private one, while in 2009 the gap was -10 percent.  It is 
not clear from our 2004 or 2009 results, however, that the public sector rewards more 
those with more experience. Gender discrimination appears to be absent from the public 
sector, as the gap was statistically insignificant in both 2004 and 2009. 
An interesting picture emerges from the interaction coefficients for occupations. 
The state pays significantly more for public administration and defense, two occupations 
that imply a vocation for public service. The other occupation that implies a public 
service vocation, education, does not pay more handsomely in the public sector. In both 
cases, the state is a near-monopoly employer: it employs about 90 percent of the workers 
in public administration and defense, and about 95 percent in education. For the other 
occupations, where the private sector has more market power and the workers have a 
meaningful public-private choice, the state’s pay policy varies, from being more generous 
in mining and less so in construction, health and financial services. A similar conclusion 
emerges from estimating the premium with the Mincerian specification (the one in 
columns two and four in Table 1) for each occupation separately. The results in Table 4 
show a positive and significant premium (for both years) in agriculture, mining, 
transportation, and public administration. The premium for all occupations where the 
private sector has significant market power (namely, except for public administration, 
defense, and education) is slightly lower than for the entire sample: 10.2 percent in 2004   18
and 8.1 percent in 2009 (compared to a full sample estimate of 10.6 percent and 9.8 
percent in Table 1).  
 
Table 4. Wage premium by occupation 
 
 
To account for the possible public-private selection bias we use a treatment effect 
model, estimating simultaneously the wage equation and the treatment equation, where 
the public-private dummy variable is regressed on a set of treatment variables. This 
procedure will account for the possible correlation between the error terms of the two 
equations. If this correlation coefficient is positive (negative), the estimated effect of 
treatment from original estimation will generally be biased away from zero (towards 
zero). The model we use for the wage equation is the baseline one from column two in 
Table 1. For the treatment equation, the public dummy variable is regressed (using a 
probit model) on the Mincerian variables from the wage equation and a number of 
instruments.  
The instruments must be correlated with the public/private employment dummy 
variable, but should not affect the worker’s wage. Our survey records information on all 
Occupation 2004  2009 
Agriculture 0.09909***    0.09741** 
Mining 0.29769***    0.19773*** 
Manufacturing 0.05348***    0.01855 
Utilities 0.13228***    0.06778* 
Construction  -0.0533        -0.0167 
Retail 0.10265***    0.03784 
Transportation, communications  0.12351***   0.12286*** 
Financial Services  -0.166***   0.03459 
Real Estate Intermediation   0.0284   0.14559 
Public Administration, Defense   0.3132***   0.25625*** 
Education 0.00294  -0.0139 
Health and social assistance  -0.0231  -0.0017 
Other social services  -0.0185  -0.0043   19
family members, so we use family-related variables to instrument for the public-private 
employment choice: the number other of public sector employees in the household, the 
number of children aged 18 or below, and marital status. To our knowledge, the first 
instrument is a novel way of instrumenting for the public-private sector choice. 
There are two reasons why this is a good instrument: first, personal example from close 
family (living under the same roof) may convince a worker to choose a career in the 
public sector.  Second, someone working in the public sector may refer a close relative 
for a job. The second instrument affects the public/private choice via the works 
hours/leisure balance: a person with minor children will prefer more leisure, and overtime 
in the public sector is an exception in Romania. The expected sign of marital status is 
positive, as a married person may prefer the work-life balance the public sector has to 
offer. 
The treatment equation results show the correlation coefficient not being 
significantly different from zero in 2009, and being very small (3.64 percent) but 
significantly different in 2004. Either way, the estimated premium is significant at 1 
percent and its value is in line with the OLS estimates in Table 1, about 10 percent. 
Therefore we can reject the hypothesis of self-selection in the public/private sector.  
 
Table 5: Instrumenting for the public-private sector choice
3 
  2004   2009  
  Wage Eqn  Treatment Eqn 
(Public/Private 
choice) 
Wage Eqn  Treatment Eqn 
(Public/Private 
choice) 
 is Public    0.107***  N/A   0.102***  N/A 
Secondary Edu  -0.2***   0.068***  -0.239***   0.041** 
                                                 
3 Because in the treatment equation we use binary probit model, the coefficients displayed are marginal 
effects evaluated at the means.   20
Univ Edu   0.431***   0.143***   0.456***   0.075*** 
Work Exper <= 5y  -0.297***  -0.272***  -0.159***  -0.131*** 
Work Exper 5-10y  -0.184***  -0.181***  -0.075***  -0.076*** 
Work Exper 11-15y  -0.081***  -0.083***  -0.052***  -0.048*** 
Work Exper 16-20y  -0.059***  -0.032*  -0.019**  -0.012 
Work Exper 26-30y  -0.009   0.004   0.011   0.005 
Work Exper 31-35y  -0.036***   0.013   0.012   0.007 
Work Exper > 35y  -0.063***   0.062**  -0.025**   0.041*** 
Term Contract  -0.196***   0.089***  -0.199***   0.059** 
Sex -0.209***   0.034***  -0.253***   0.053*** 
Bucharest    0.19***  -0.072***   0.239***  -0.04*** 
Married Instrument   0.104***  Instrument   0.098*** 
Minors Instrument   0.011*  Instrument   0.010** 
Family Public Sect  Instrument   0.813***  Instrument   0.523*** 
Cons 6.05***  -2.238***    6.798***  -2.552*** 
Lambda  N/A   0.015**  N/A   0.008 
Rho  N/A   0.0364  N/A   0.0218 
Sigma  N/A   0.4036  N/A   0.3575 
Wald-test 0.0000    0.0000   




V. Decomposing the premium 
Another caveat of the regression in Table 1 is that the wage premium is estimated 
around the mean from an OLS regression. To improve on this we use quantile regressions 
and decompose the differences between the public and private sector wage distributions. 
The decomposition method pioneered by Melly (2005a) enables us to decompose the 
difference between the two distributions at every quantile into the impact of the personal 
characteristics (or covariates, or independent variables), the returns to these (or 
coefficients), and residuals. This approach is similar to the Machado and Mata (2005) 
decomposition, but on top of decomposing the inequality in the impact of coefficients and 
of covariates, it also breaks down the first term into the impact of residuals (within group 
inequality) and coefficients (between group inequality). This approach therefore allows   21
for different experiments like what would the distribution of wages in the public sector be 
when applying the educational levels or the coefficients from the private sector. 
For the 50
th quintile—that is, for the regression around the median—we can write: 
t t t t u X w + = ) 5 . 0 ( β         ( 1 )  
where 
t w  is the log of individual wage, 
t X  is a vector of individual 
characteristics (covariates),  ) 5 . 0 (
t β  denotes an estimate of the coefficients around the 
median (the return to characteristics), 
t u is the error term, and t is the group index. The 
same methodology can be applied for the decomposition of the public sector wage 
inequality between 2004 and 2009 (t denotes the year), as well as for the public-private 
wage differential (t denotes the sector). 
From the equation above, and bearing in mind that the conditional 
quintile ) ( ˆ ) | ( τ β τ
t t t t X X w Quant = , it is possible to estimate the τ th quintile of the 
residual distribution of 
t u  (within group inequality) as  )) 5 . 0 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ (
t t t X β τ β − . Using this 
and assuming t={State,Private}, we can also define:  
) 5 . 0 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ) 5 . 0 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ , P P S rP mS β τ β β τ β − + =      ( 2 )  
or 
) ( ) 5 . 0 ( ˆ )) 5 . 0 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ) 5 . 0 ( ˆ ( ) ( ˆ , τ β β τ β β τ β
P S P P P S P rS mP P u X X X + = − + =  
In other words, we can generate a counterfactual distribution assuming that 
median return to characteristics in the public sector ( ) 5 . 0 ( ˆ S β ) had been applied to the 
private sector (
P X ) and with the same distribution of residuals as in the private sector 
(from Equation 2, 
P u ). The difference between a particular “synthetic” quintile obtained 
using 
P β ˆ  and 
P X  (therefore a quintile of  ) ( ˆ ˆ τ β
P P P X w = , denoted  ) , ˆ (
P P X Quant β τ and   22
the quintile  ) , ˆ (
, P rS mP X Quant β τ is therefore just the impact of the change in residuals for 
that quintile between the public (S) and private (P) regressions. By the same token, the 
impact of the change in coefficients (with respect to the median regression) between the 
public and private regressions can be expressed as  
) , ˆ (
, P rS mP X Quant β τ - ) , ˆ (
P S X Quant β τ = 
))] 5 . 0 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ( )) 5 . 0 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ [(
S S P P P X β τ β β τ β − − −  
and the impact of the change in covariates as  ) , ˆ (
P S X Quant β τ - ) , ˆ (
S S X Quant β τ . 
Summing up the three terms we get: 
) , ˆ (
P P X Quant β τ - ) , ˆ (
, P rS mP X Quant β τ + ) , ˆ (
, P rS mP X Quant β τ - ) , ˆ (
P S X Quant β τ + 
) , ˆ (
P S X Quant β τ - ) , ˆ (
S S X Quant β τ = 
) , ˆ (
P P X Quant β τ - ) , ˆ (
S S X Quant β τ             (3) 
thus the variation of an estimated quintile of the wage distribution (across time or 
between the public and private sector) can be decomposed into changes in residuals, 
coefficients, and covariates. 
The public-private wage premium decomposition for 2004 and 2009 is shown in 
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Fig. 5. Public-private wage premium decomposition, 2004
4 
 
Fig. 6. Public-private wage premium decomposition, 2009 
                                                 
4 The shaded area represents the 95 percent confidence interval, obtained by 200 bootstrapping replications.   24
 
 
The total wage premium is positive and increasing in wage, but starts decreasing 
after about 75
th quantile. This shows that the public sector not only overpaid compared to 
the private one, but in doing so it had a more unequal wage distribution. There are two 
drivers affecting the wage premium across quintiles: changes in covariates and in 
residuals. The third factor – changes in coefficients (or returns to characteristics) between 
the public and private sector—has a positive and more or less constant contribution of 10 
percent in the three years under consideration.  This emphasizes a conclusion we drew 
before: the public sector rewards the same characteristics (education, experience, gender) 
better than the private one. 
The first driver is the difference in covariates (or personal characteristics), which 
increases across all wage quintiles. This is entirely expected, and reflects the consistent   25
component of the wage-setting policy. The other driver is the difference in residuals—
namely, the difference between how far the residuals are spread around zero for the 
median regression (50
th quintile regression). The difference in residuals is significant and  
positive in the middle of the wage distribution, and negative in the upper tail. The 
negative difference (‘ceiling’) at the top of the wage distribution means that there is more 
dispersion at the top of the wage distribution in the private sector than in the public one, 
which is expected: at the top of the distribution, the private sector pays better. As it is 
evident from Figs. 5 and 6, the ceiling was more pronounced in 2004.  
These findings are also confirmed by the inequality measures shown in Table 6 
below. The difference between the 90/10 ratio increased in the favour of the public 
sector: from +0.45 in 2004 (3.46 – 3.01) to +0.53 in 2009 (3.28 – 2.76). This shows a 
reduction in inequality in the private sector which was not matched by a similar move in 
the public one. This conclusion is also supported by a sharp reduction in the Gini 
coefficient in the private sector (2.4 percentage points over 5 years), which was again not 
matched in the public sector. The Gini coefficient in the public sector dropped by only 
1.4 percentage points.  Because the change in residuals (the dotted line) show the upper 
tail of the private sector wage distribution became shorter in 2009, the 90/50 percentile 
ratio displays the same pattern as the 90/10 ratio: the inequality in the private sector 
decreased more (1.98 to 1.8) compared to the public one (1.95 to 1.8). This dynamics 
shows that the firings that took place in the private sector in 2009 occurred mostly in the 
top half of the wage distribution and led to a decrease in inequality, while the public 
sector was slow to adjust in the wake of the crisis. 
   26
Table 6. Inequality measures 
 2004  2009 
Statistic  Private Public Private Public 
p90/p10 3.016  3.466  2.757  3.283 
p90/p50 1.985  1.949  1.807  1.799 
p10/p50 0.658  0.562  0.655  0.548 
Relative Mean 
Deviation 
20.07% 19.91% 18.14% 18.74% 
Gini 27.69%  27.56%  25.30%  26.18% 
 
VI.  Concluding remarks 
Our paper shows the existence of a large, positive, and significant wage premium 
(about 10 percent) in the Romanian public sector between 2004 and 2009, which is at 
odds with the negative premium uncovered in a number of transition economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The public sector doesn’t strive to be more egalitarian and 
equitable, as the wage premium grows in relative terms across the wage distribution. 
Breaking down the premium by occupational sector, we find out that the highest premium 
(25-30 percent) is in that sector where the state has the highest market share of 
employment, namely in public administration and defense. This finding suggests that 
workers in these sectors are receiving a rent, unrelated to their personal skills and 
abilities. A qualifier must be added, however: employees in the defense sector and in 
some parts of public administration face a number of limitations in terms of secondary 
sources of income, including the interdiction to start a business. 
To account for the possibility of self-selection in the public and private sectors, 
we instrument the public sector dummy variable with the number of other public sector 
employees in the family, marital status, and the number of minor children in the family. 
Two conclusions arise from this: the number of other public sector employees in the 
family is a significant driver of public sector employment, most likely by facilitating   27
access to the job, and the self-selection effect is weak or non-existent, as the public sector 
wage premium remains significant and in the same range (7-10 percent). 
We further decompose the wage premium into the effect of coefficients, 
covariates, and residuals. This decomposition shows that in the bottom half of the wage 
distribution the biggest part of the premium is explained by differences in coefficients 
(the public sector rewards the same personal characteristics differently). In the top part it 
is the difference in covariates that represents the biggest part of the premium – this shows 
that higher wages are due in this case to personal characteristics, like education or 
experience, which is entirely justifiable. The difference in residuals shows a ceiling on 
public wages: it is positive in the middle of the wage distribution, and negative in the 
upper tail. The negative difference at the top of the wage distribution means that the 
private sector pays better and its wage distribution exhibits a longer right tail.  
In spite of these ceilings and floors, the increase in public sector wages in the 
period under study (when the public wage bill grew from 4.8 percent of GDP in 2004 to 9 
percent in 2009), created a more unequal wage distribution in the public sector compared 
to the private sector: the Gini coefficient went from being similar to being about one 
percentage point higher in 5 years. The Romanian government’s 2010 decision to cut 
public sector wages by 10 percent, although it did help bringing the budget deficit under 
control, did not address the fact that there is more inequality within the public sector 
compared to the private one. A cut across the board in all public wages by the same 
percentage did not help to remedy this inequality.  
This paper therefore shows two objectives the policymakers should follow: (a) 
reduce the public-private wage inequality by cutting/freezing those public wages that   28
offer a better reward for the same characteristics (education, experience) compared to the 
private sector, and (b) reduce the inequality within the public sector itself. This latter goal 
is to be achieved by the law of public sector compensation, to be implemented over the 
next few years. However, a unified compensation framework should go hand in hand 
with a unified performance evaluation. A clear framework for performance evaluation 
should be laid down, especially for those public services that have no private counterpart, 
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Appendix 1. 
  2004          2009         
Variable Total    Private    Pub
lic 
 Total    Priv
ate 
 Public   
  19900   12628   7272   18516   1348
1 
 5035   












Log Wage  6.031  0.487  5.957  0.471  6.165  0.488 6.844  0.455 6.795  0.439 6.981  0.469 
Secondary Edu  0.081  0.272  0.085  0.279  0.072  0.259 0.072  0.259 0.077  0.266 0.060  0.237 
High-school Edu (reference 
group) 
0.658 0.474  0.727 0.446  0.532  0.335  0.650 0.477  0.706 0.456  0.494  0.500 
Univ Edu  0.261  0.439  0.188  0.390  0.395  0.489 0.278  0.448 0.217  0.413 0.447  0.497 
Work Exper <= 5y  0.098  0.297  0.115  0.319  0.068 0.251 0.096  0.294 0.106  0.308 0.067  0.250 
Work Exper 5-10y  0.132  0.338  0.145  0.352  0.107 0.310 0.116  0.320 0.119  0.323 0.109  0.312 
Work Exper 11-15y  0.165  0.371  0.171  0.376  0.154 0.361 0.154  0.361 0.160  0.366 0.138  0.345 
Work Exper 16-20y  0.166  0.372  0.172  0.377  0.155 0.362 0.155  0.362 0.153  0.360 0.162  0.369 
Work Exper 21-25y (reference 
group) 
0.133 0.340  0.129 0.335  0.141  0.348  0.162 0.369  0.163 0.369  0.161  0.368 
Work Exper 26-30y  0.136  0.343  0.126  0.332  0.156 0.363 0.116  0.320 0.111  0.314 0.130  0.336 
Work Exper 31-35y  0.112  0.316  0.096  0.295  0.141 0.348 0.110  0.313 0.104  0.306 0.127  0.332 
Work Exper > 35y  0.058  0.233  0.047  0.211  0.078 0.268 0.090  0.287 0.085  0.278 0.106  0.308 
Sex (0=male,1=female)  0.453  0.498  0.438  0.496  0.482 0.500 0.445  0.497 0.420  0.494 0.517  0.500 
Term Contract  0.037  0.190  0.036  0.187  0.039 0.194 0.025  0.156 0.023  0.151 0.030  0.170 
Bucharest   0.146  0.353  0.147  0.354  0.144  0.352 0.163  0.369 0.172  0.378 0.136  0.343 
Fam Members in Public Sect  0.626  0.774  0.179  0.422  1.444 0.579 0.483  0.725 0.139  0.380 1.448  0.576 
Marital status  0.228  0.419  0.252  0.434  0.183 0.387 0.226  0.418 0.234  0.424 0.203  0.403 
No of children  0.870  0.923  0.883  0.926  0.846 0.916 0.739  0.875 0.735  0.875 0.750  0.873 
Agriculture 0.027  0.163  0.028  0.166  0.025  0.157 0.024  0.154 0.026  0.159 0.020  0.142 
Mining 0.021  0.143  0.008  0.090  0.045  0.206 0.016  0.124 0.010  0.099 0.032  0.175 
Manufacturing 0.308  0.462  0.429  0.495  0.087  0.281 0.256  0.436 0.331  0.471 0.045  0.207 
Utilities 0.033  0.179  0.015  0.120  0.067  0.250 0.025  0.157 0.019  0.136 0.043  0.203   31
Construction 0.074  0.262  0.103  0.303  0.023  0.149 0.096  0.295 0.125  0.331 0.017  0.128 
Retail 0.154  0.361  0.225  0.417  0.024  0.154 0.194  0.395 0.256  0.436 0.019  0.136 
Transportation, 
communications 
0.077 0.266  0.069 0.254  0.091  0.288  0.086 0.281  0.089 0.284  0.080  0.272 
Financial Services  0.018  0.134  0.017  0.131  0.020 0.139 0.022  0.148 0.024  0.154 0.017  0.130 
Real Estate Intermediation  0.014  0.117  0.018  0.133  0.007 0.082 0.018  0.132 0.022  0.145 0.007  0.084 
Public Administration, Defense  0.088  0.283  0.013  0.115  0.224 0.417 0.082  0.275 0.011  0.103 0.284  0.451 
Education 0.070  0.256  0.005  0.071  0.189  0.392 0.061  0.239 0.007  0.081 0.213  0.409 
Health and social assistance  0.066  0.248  0.018  0.134  0.153 0.360 0.061  0.239 0.021  0.145 0.172  0.378 
Other social services  0.047  0.212  0.050  0.217  0.043 0.203 0.056  0.229 0.058  0.233 0.049  0.217 
 
 